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1 Two Kinds of Symmetry
Abstractly, a symmetry of a structure is an automorphism a transformation
that maps the elements of an object back onto themselves so as to preserve the
structure of that object.
A physical theory species a set of models mathematical structures that
may be used to represent various di¤erent situations, actual as well as merely
possible, and to make claims about them. Any application of a physical the-
ory is to a situation involving some system, actual or merely possible. Only
rarely is that system the entire universe: typically, one applies a theory to some
subsystem, regarded as a relatively isolated part of its world. The application
proceeds by using the theory to model the situation of that subsystem in a
way that abstracts from and idealizes the subsystems own features, and also
neglects or idealizes its interactions with the rest of the world.
We can therefore enquire about the symmetries of the class of models of a
theory; or we can enquire about the symmetries of a class of situations, whether
or not we have in mind a theory intended to model them. The rst enquiry
may reveal some theoretical symmetry : the second may reveal some empirical
symmetry. An empirical symmetry can be recognized even without a physical
theory to account for it. But it does not cease to be empirical if and when such
a theory becomes available. A theory may entail an empirical symmetry.
Galileo illustrated his relativity principle by describing a famous empirical
symmetry of this kind.
Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin below decks
on some large ship, and have with you there some ies, butteries
and other small ying animals... When you have observed all these
things carefully..., have the ship proceed with any speed you like,
so long as the motion is uniform and not uctuating this way and
that. You will discover not the least change in all the e¤ects named,
nor could you tell from any of them whether the ship was moving or
standing still.
His implicit claim is that a situation inside the cabin when the ship is in
motion is indistinguishable from another situation inside the cabin when the
ship is at rest by observations conned to those situations. The claim follows
from a principle of the relativity of all uniform horizontal motion. While we
know today that an unqualied form of Galileos claim is false, in a modied
form it continues to play an important role in physics.
Galileos implicit claim is that situations related by a uniform collective
horizontal motion are empirically symmetrical. Specically
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A 1-1 mapping ' : S ! S of a set of situations onto itself is an
empirical symmetry if and only if any two situations related by '
are indistinguishable by means of measurements conned to each
situation.
A measurement is conned to a situation just in case it is a measurement
of intrinsic properties of (one or more objects in) that situation. Note that
the reference to measurement is not superuous here, in so far as a situation
may feature unmeasurable intrinsic properties. If every function ' 2  is an
empirical symmetry of S, then S is symmetric under -transformations. Note
that situations in S related by a transformation 'may be in the same or di¤erent
possible worlds: if ' is an empirical symmetry, then '(s) may be in the same
world w as s, but only if w is itself su¢ ciently symmetric.
One may distinguish symmetries of the set of situations to which a theory
may be applied from symmetries of the set of the theorys models.
A mapping f :M!M of the set of models of a theory  onto itself
is a theoretical symmetry of  if and only if the following condition
obtains: For every model m of  that may be used to represent
(a situation s in) a possible world w, f(m) may also be used to
represent (s in) w.
If every function f 2 F is a symmetry of , then  is symmetric under
F -transformations. Theoretical symmetries may be purely formal features of a
theory, in so far as they relate di¤erent but equivalent ways the theory has of
representing one and the same empirical situation. One model may be more
conveniently applied to a given situation than another model related to it by
a theoretical symmetry, but the theoretical as well as empirical content of any
claim made about that situation will be the same no matter which model is ap-
plied. But a theoretical symmetry of a theory may entail an empirical symmetry,
in which case it is not a purely formal feature of the theory.
The empirical symmetry associated with uniform velocity boosts in special
relativity is a consequence of a theoretical symmetry of special relativity, if one
associates each model of that theory with an inertial frame with respect to
which a given situation is represented. For then the strong empirical symmetry
becomes a consequence of the Lorentz invariance of the theory the fact that
the Lorentz transform of any model is also a model of the theory. The Lorentz
transform of any model may be used to represent the same situation as the
original model (from the perspective of a boosted inertial frame); but it may also
be used to represent a boosted duplicate of that situation (from the perspective
of the original frame). (Here a duplicate of a situation is a situation that shares
all its intrinsic properties.) The special theory of relativity entails the empirical
symmetry associated with Lorentz invariance by implying that these empirically
equivalent situations are not merely empirically indistinguishable by means of
measurements conned to those situations, but indistinguishable by reference
to any intrinsic properties or relations of entities each involves.
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Relativity principles assert empirical symmetries. If "local" gauge trans-
formations reect some similar empirical symmetry, then they also represent
distinct but indistinguishable situations. But I shall defend the conventional
wisdom that the successful employment of Yang-Mills theories warrants the
conclusion that "local" gauge transformations are only theoretical symmetries
of these theories that reect no corresponding non-trivial empirical symmetries
among the situations they represent. "Local" gauge symmetry is a purely formal
feature of these theories.
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2 Warm-up Exercise: Faradays Cube
Michael Faraday constructed a hollow cube with sides 12 feet long, covered it
with good conducting materials but insulated it carefully from the ground, and
electried it so that it was at a large potential di¤erence from the rest of his
laboratory. He made the following entry in his diary in 1836:
I went into this cube and lived in it, but though I used lighted candles,
electrometers, and all other tests of electrical states, I could not nd the least
inuence on them
Both Faraday and Galileo described observations of symmetries in nature.
In each case, di¤erent situations are compared, and it is noted that these are
indistinguishable with respect to a whole class of phenomena. But while velocity
boosts are paradigm empirical symmetries, gauge symmetry is usually taken to
be a purely formal feature of a theory. In this case, adding the same constant
to all electrical potentials is a symmetry of classical electromagnetism. Why
doesnt Faradays cube provide a perfect analogue of Galileos ship for local
gauge symmetry? (Note that the electric potential transformation '! '+ a is
an example of a local gauge transformation A ! A+@ with A = ('; A)
and  = at.)
There is an important disanalogy between the Lorentz boost symmetry im-
perfectly illustrated by Galileos ship and the local gauge symmetry illustrated
by Faradays cube. While both are theoretical symmetries of the relevant theo-
ries, only in the former case does this theoretical symmetry imply a correspond-
ing empirical symmetry.
In order that charging the exterior of Galileos cube should provide an exam-
ple of the relevant kind of empirical symmetry, two conditions must be satised.
It must produce a situation inside the cube that di¤ers from its situation when
uncharged in a way that corresponds to performing a local gauge transforma-
tion on its interior. But despite this di¤erence, the transformed situation must
remain internally indistinguishable from the original situation.
To see how it might be possible to meet both conditions, consider the analo-
gous case of the Lorentz-boosted (space!)ship. Even though the situation inside
the ship is a perfect duplicate of its situation before boosting, the theory itself
implies that these situations are related by a boost transformation: because
the only theoretical models that represent both situations at once are models in
which the two situations are related by a velocity boost.
But classical electromagnetic theory has no analogous implication in the case
of Galileos cube. It contains models, each of which represents the cube both
before and after charging, that represent the cubes interior as being in exactly
the same state, independent of the charge on its exterior! There is no theoret-
ical or experimental reason to suppose that charging the cubes exterior does
anything to alter the electromagnetic state of its interior. Charging the exterior
of Faradays cube is not a way of performing a local gauge transformation on
its interior: it is no more e¤ective than painting it blue, or simply waiting for a
day!
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3 The  Vacuum
The ground state of a quantized non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge theory is usually
described by a real-valued parameter  a fundamental new constant of nature.
The structure of this vacuum state is often said to arise from a degeneracy of the
vacuum of the corresponding classical theory. The degeneracy allegedly follows
from the fact that "large" (but not "small") local gauge transformations connect
physically distinct states of zero eld energy. In a classical non-Abelian Yang-
Mills gauge theory, "large" gauge transformations connect models of distinct
but indistinguishable situations. This seems to show that at least "large" local
gauge symmetry is an empirical symmetry.
In clarifying the distinction between "large" and "small" gauge transforma-
tions we will be driven to a deeper analysis of the signicance of gauge symme-
try. But understanding the -vacuum will require rening, not abandoning, the
thesis that "local" gauge symmetry is a purely theoretical symmetry.
Before moving to the quantum theory, consider a classical SU(2) Yang-Mills
gauge theory with action
S =
1
2g2
Z
Tr(FF
)d4x (1)
where F = @A   @A + [A;A ]
and A = Aj
j
2i transform as
A ! A0 = UAUy + (@U)Uy; F ! UFUy (2)
under a "local" gauge transformation U(x; t). (Here j (j = 1; 2; 3) are Pauli
spin matrices.)
The eld energy is zero if F = 0: that condition is consistent with
A = 0 and gauge transforms of this. Now restrict attention to those gauge
transformations for which A00 = 0, @0A
0
j = 0 i.e.
A = 0! A0j(x) = f@jU(x)gUy(x); A00 = 0 (3)
These are generated by functions U : R3 ! SU(2).
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Those functions that satisfy U(x)! 1 for jxj ! 1 constitute smooth maps
U : S3 ! SU(2), where S3 is the 3-sphere. Some of these may be continu-
ously deformed into the identity map U(x) = 1. But others cannot be. The
maps divide into a countable set of equivalence classes, each characterized by
an element of the homotopy group 3(SU(2)) = Z called the winding number.
Maps in the same equivalence class as the identity map are said to generate
"small" "local" gauge transformations: these are taken to relate alternative rep-
resentations of the same classical vacuum. But A0, A
00
 generated from A = 0
by maps U(x) from di¤erent equivalence classes are often said to represent
distinct classical vacua, and A0, A
00
 are said to be related by "large" gauge
transformations. (It is important to distinguish this claim from the quite di¤er-
ent proposition, according to which degenerate quantum vacua may be related
by a "global" gauge transformation in cases of spontaneous symmetry break-
ing. We are concerned at this point with a possible degeneracy in the classical
vacuum of a non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge theory.)
But if "local" gauge symmetry is a purely formal feature of a theory, then
a gauge transformation cannot connect representations of physically distinct
situations, even if it is "large"! And yet, textbook discussions of the quantum
-vacuum typically represent this by a superposition of states, each element of
which is said to correspond to a distinct state from the degenerate classical
vacuum.
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4 Two Analogies
Such discussions frequently appeal to a simple analogy from elementary quan-
tum mechanics. Consider a particle moving in a one-dimensional periodic po-
tential of nite height, like a sine wave. Classically, the lowest energy state
is innitely degenerate: the particle just sits at the bottom of one or other of
the identical wells in the potential. But quantum mechanics permits tunnelling
between neighboring wells, which removes the degeneracy. In the absence of
tunnelling, there would be a countably innite set of degenerate ground states
of the form  n(x) =  0(x   na) where a is the period of the potential. These
are related by the translation operator T^a: T^a (x) =  (x   a). T^a is unitary
and commutes with the Hamiltonian H^. Hence there are joint eigenstates ji
of H^ and T^a satisfying T^a ji = exp(i) ji.
Such a state has the form
ji =
+1X
n= 1
expf ing jni (4)
where  n(x) is the wave function of state jni. When tunnelling is allowed
for, the energy of these states depends on the parameter  2 [0; 2). It is as if
quantum tunneling between the distinct classical ground states has removed the
degeneracy, resulting in a spectrum of states of di¤erent energies parametrized
by , each corresponding to a di¤erent superposition of classical ground states.
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An alternative analogy is provided by a charged pendulum swinging from a
long, thin solenoid whose ux  is generating a static Aharonov-Bohm potential
A. The Hamiltonian is
H^ =
1
2m
[ i(r  ieA)]2 + V (5)
With a natural "tangential" choice of gauge for A this becomes
H^ =   1
2ml2

d
d!
  ielA
2
+ V (!) (6)
where the pendulum has mass m, charge e, length l and angle coordinate !. If
the wave function is transformed according to
 (!) = exp
24ie !Z
0
lAd!0
35'(!) (7)
then the transformed wave function satises the Schrödinger equation with sim-
plied Hamiltonian
H^' =   1
2m
d2
d!2
+ V (!) (8)
The boundary condition  (! + 2) =  (!) now becomes
'(! + 2) = expf ieg'(!) (9)
which is of the same form as in the rst analogy: T^2' = expfig', with
 =  e.
Unlike the periodic potential, the charged pendulum features a unique clas-
sical ground state. The potential barrier that would have to be overcome to
"ip" the pendulum over its support can be tunnelled through quantum me-
chanically, but the tunnel ends up back where it started from! This produces
a -dependent ground state energy as in the analogy of the periodic potential.
But in this case there is a single state corresponding to an external parameter
 rather than a spectrum of states labeled by an internal parameter .
Which is the better analogy? Is the -vacuum in a quantized non-Abelian
gauge theory more like a quantum state of the periodic potential, or a state of
the charged quantum pendulum?
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In his book Classical Theory of Gauge Fields, Rubakov describes both analo-
gies. He notes that vacua of a classical Yang-Mills gauge theory related by a
"large" gauge transformation are topologically inequivalent, since their so-called
Chern-Simons numbers are di¤erent. The Chern-Simons number nCS associated
with potential A is dened as follows:
nCS (A)  1
162
Z
d3xijk

Aai @jA
a
k +
1
3
abcAaiA
b
jA
c
k

(10)
and if A00,A
0
 are related by a "large" gauge transformation of the form (3) with
winding number n, then nCS
 
A00

= nCS
 
A0

+ n. But in a semi-classical
treatment, quantum tunneling between them is possible through quantum tun-
neling. This suggests that the classical vacua are indeed distinct, and that a
"large" gauge transformation represents a change from one physical situation
to another. If so, symmetry under "large" gauge transformations is not just
a theoretical symmetry but reects an empirical symmetry of a non-Abelian
Yang-Mills gauge theory. This favors the rst analogy.
But Rubakov then goes on to o¤er an alternative (but allegedly equivalent!)
perspective, when he says (on page 277)
From the point of view of gauge-invariant quantities, topologically
distinct classical vacua are equivalent, since they di¤er only by a
gauge transformation. Let us identify these vacua. Then the situ-
ation becomes analogous to the quantum-mechanical model of the
pendulum.
From this perspective, even "large" gauge transformations lead from a sin-
gle classical vacuum state back into an alternative representation of that same
state! Is this perspective legitimate? If it is, how can it be equivalent to a
view according to which a "large" gauge transformation represents an empiri-
cal transformation between distinct states of a non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge
theory?
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5 Are "Large" Gauge Transformations Empiri-
cal?
Consider rst a purely classical non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge theory. If it has
models that represent distinct degenerate classical vacua, what is the physical
di¤erence between these vacua? Models related by a "large" gauge transfor-
mation are characterized by di¤erent Chern-Simons numbers, and one might
take these to exhibit a di¤erence in the intrinsic properties of situations they
represent. But it is questionable whether the Chern-Simons number of a gauge
conguration represents an intrinsic property of that conguration, even if a
di¤erence in Chern-Simons number represents an intrinsic di¤erence between
gauge congurations. Perhaps Chern-Simons numbers are like velocities in mod-
els of special relativity. The velocity assigned to an object in a model of special
relativity does not represent an intrinsic property of that object, even though
that theory does distinguish in its models between situations involving objects
moving with di¤erent relative velocities. It was this latter distinction that proves
critical to establishing that Lorentz boosts are empirical symmetries of situa-
tions in a special relativistic world.
So does a di¤erence in Chern-Simons number represent an intrinsic di¤er-
ence between classical vacua in a purely classical non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge
theory? There is no reason to believe that it does. For it to do so, the theory
would have to include models representing more than one vacuum state at once,
where the distinct vacua are represented by di¤erent Chern-Simons numbers in
every such model. Such distinct vacua extend over all space. So they could all
be represented within a single model only if it represented them as occurring at
di¤erent times. But topologically distinct vacua are separated by an energy bar-
rier, and in the purely classical theory this cannot be overcome. So there is no
representation within a single model of the purely classical theory of vacua with
di¤erent Chern-Simons numbers. There is no reason to believe that a "large"
gauge transformation represents an empirical transformation between distinct
vacuum states of a purely classical non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge theory.
According to a semi-classical theory, vacua with di¤erent Chern-Simons
numbers can be connected by tunnelling through the potential barrier that
separates them. So such a theory can model a single situation involving more
than one such vacuum state, each obtaining at a di¤erent time. Moreover, no
model of this theory represents these states as having the same Chern-Simons
numbers. Perhaps this justies the conclusion that in a world truly described
by such a theory a "large" gauge transformation would represent an empirical
transformation between distinct vacuum states. But we do not live in such a
world.
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The  vacuum of a fully quantized non-Abelian Yang-Mills gauge theory is
non-degenerate and symmetric under "large" as well as "small" gauge transfor-
mations. Analogies with the periodic potential and quantum pendulum suggest
that it be expressed in the form
ji =
+1X
n= 1
expf ing jni (11)
where state jni corresponds to a classical state with Chern-Simons number n.
But not only the  vacuum but the whole theory is symmetric under "large"
gauge transformations. So a generator U^ of "large" gauge transformations com-
mutes not only with the Hamiltonian but with all observables. It acts as a
so-called "superselection operator" that separates the large Hilbert space of
states into distinct superselection sectors, between which no superpositions are
possible. Physical states are therefore restricted to those lying in a single su-
perselection sector of the entire Hilbert space. Hence every physical state of the
theory, including ji, is an eigenstate of U^ .
Now there is an operator U^1 corresponding to a "large" gauge transformation
with winding number 1,
U^1 jni = jn+ 1i (12)
from which it follows that none of the states jni is a physical state of the theory!
This theory cannot model situations involving any state corresponding to a clas-
sical vacuum with denite Chern-Simons number, still less a situation involving
two or more states corresponding to classical vacua with di¤erent Chern-Simons
numbers. Consequently, "large" gauge transformations in a fully quantized non-
Abelian Yang-Mills gauge theory do not represent physical transformations, and
symmetry under "large" gauge transformations is not an empirical symmetry.
There is no di¤erence in this respect between "large" and "small" gauge trans-
formations.
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6 Are They Really Gauge Transformations?
There are several reasons why it remains important to better understand the
di¤erence between "large" and "small" gauge transformations. One reason is
that doing so will help to resolve the following apparent paradox.
Two beliefs are widely shared. The rst belief is that "local" gauge transfor-
mations implement no empirical symmetry and therefore have no direct empiri-
cal consequences. The second belief is that "global" gauge transformations have
indirect empirical consequences via Noethers Theorem, including the conserva-
tion of electric charge. The paradox arises when one notes that a "global" gauge
transformation appears as a special case of a "local" gauge transformation. If
"local" gauge symmetry is a purely formal symmetry, how can (just) this special
case of it have even indirect empirical consequences?
Another reason is to appreciate why some (e.g. Domenico Giulini) have
proposed that we make
a clear and unambiguous distinction between proper physical sym-
metries on one hand, and gauge symmetries or mere automorphisms
of the mathematical scheme on the other (Giulini(2003), p.289)
The proposed distinction would classify invariance under "small" gauge sym-
metries as a gauge symmetry, but invariance under "large" gauge transforma-
tions as a proper physical symmetry. It is founded on an analysis of gauge in
the framework of constrained Hamiltonian systems.
The guiding principle is to follow Diracs proposal by identifying gauge sym-
metries as just those transformations on the classical phase-space representation
of the state of such a system that are generated by its rst-class constraint func-
tions. In a classical Yang-Mills gauge theory, these are precisely those generated
by the so-called Gauss constraint functions, such as the function on the left-hand
side of equation
r:E = 0 (13)
in the case of pure electromagnetism.
Giulini(2003) applies this principle to a quantized Hamiltonian system repre-
senting an isolated charge distribution in an electromagnetic eld. He concludes
that the gauge symmetries of this system consist of all and only those "local"
gauge transformations on the quantized elds that leave unchanged both the
asymptotic electromagnetic gauge potential A^ and the distant charged matter
eld. A "global" gauge transformation corresponding to a constant phase ro-
tation in the matter eld does not count as a gauge symmetry since it is not
generated by the Gauss constraint (or any other rst-class constraint) function.
Rather, "global" U(1) phase transformations would be associated with what
Giulini calls physical symmetries. According to Giulini(2003) (p.308)
This is the basic and crucial di¤erence between local and global
gauge transformations.
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The formalism represents the charge of the system dynamically by an opera-
tor Q^ that generates translations in a coordinate corresponding to an additional
degree of freedom on the boundary in the dynamical description. A charge su-
perselection rule, stating that all observables commute with the charge operator,
is equivalent to the impossibility of localizing the system in this new coordinate.
Consequently, conservation of charge implies that translations in this additional
degree of freedom count as physical symmetries for Giulini. So conservation of
charge is equivalent both to the existence of these symmetries, and (by Noethers
rst theorem) to the "global" gauge symmetry of the Lagrangian. But these
physical symmetries do not correspond to gauge symmetries, either "global" or
"local", since they a¤ect neither the gauge potential nor the phase of the matter
eld.
It is hard to argue that these novel physical symmetries are empirical. No
operational procedures are specied to permit measurement of the additional
degrees of freedom, and these attach on a boundary which is eventually removed
arbitrarily far away. But even if such a new physical symmetry were empirical, it
would not correspond to any constant phase change. A "global" gauge symmetry
would still not entail any corresponding empirical symmetry.
This delicate relation between "global" gauge transformations and some
other physical symmetry helps to resolve the apparent paradox outlined above.
A"global" gauge transformation is not merely a special case of a "local" gauge
transformation. Indeed, the constrained Hamiltonian approach provides a valu-
able perspective from which it is not even appropriately classied as a gauge
transformation.
This perspective illuminates the distinction between "large" and "small"
gauge transformations more generally. As Giulini put it in 1995, in Yang-Mills
theories
it is the Gauss constraint that declares some of the formally present
degrees of freedom to be physically nonexistent. But it only gen-
erates the identity component of asymptotically trivial transforma-
tions, leaving out the long ranging ones which preserve the asymp-
totic structure imposed by boundary conditions as well as those not
in the identity component of the asymptotically trivial ones. These
should be considered as proper physical symmetries which act on
physically existing degrees of freedom.
Whether the constrained Hamiltonian approach to gauge symmetry estab-
lishes that "large" gauge transformations correspond to empirical symmetries is
more sensitive to theoretical context than Giulinis last sentence seems to allow.
But the approach certainly shows that not only a "global" gauge transformation
but any "large" gauge transformation not generated by a Gauss constraint is
very di¤erent from the "local" gauge symmetries that it does generate.
13
7 The  Vacuum in a Loop Representation
The availability of loop representations of quantized Yang-Mills theories has in-
teresting implications for the nature of the  vacuum. Recall that when the
theory is non-Abelian, "large" gauge transformations with non-zero winding
number connect potential states with di¤erent ChernSimons numbers, includ-
ing di¤erent candidates for the lowest-energy, or vacuum, state of the eld. Re-
quiring that the theory be symmetric under such "large" gauge transformations
implies that the actual vacuum state is a superposition of all these candidate
states of the form
ji =
+1X
n= 1
expf ing jni (14)
where  is an otherwise undetermined parameter a fundamental constant of
nature.
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Associated with the  vacuum is an additional term proportional to F aF a
that enters the e¤ective Lagrangian density for quantum chromodynamics
LQCD =  a(iD  m) a  
1
4
FaF
a (15)
+

642
F
aF a
 unless the value of  is zero, in which case this term itself becomes zero.
It turns out that certain empirical consequences of quantum chromodynamics
are sensitive to the presence of this extra term: if it were present, then strong
interactions would violate two distinct discrete symmetries, namely parity and
charge conjugation symmetry. Experimental tests have shown that jj  10 10,
making one suspect that in fact  = 0. This fact that of all the possible real
number values it could take on,  appears to be zero is known as the strong
CP problem. Various solutions have been o¤ered, several of which appeal to
some new physical mechanism that intervenes to force  to equal 0. But from
the perspective of a loop representation, there is no need to introduce  as a
parameter in the rst place. I quote (Fort and Gambini, 2000):
It is interesting to speculate what would happen if from the be-
ginning holonomies were used to describe the physical interactions
instead of vector potentials. Probably we would not be discussing
the strong CP problem. This would simply be considered as an ar-
tifact of an overdescription of nature, by means of gauge potentials,
which is still necessary in order to compute quantities by using the
powerful perturbative techniques. From this perspective, the strong
CP problem is just a matter of how we describe nature rather than
being a feature of nature itself. (p.348)
As Fort and Gambini explain, when a theory is formulated in a loop/path
representation, all states and variables are automatically invariant under both
"small" and "large" gauge transformations, so there is no possibility of introduc-
ing a parameter  (as in equation (11)) to describe a hypothetical superposition
of states that are not so invariant. While the conventional perspective makes
one wonder why  should equal zero, from the loop perspective there is no need
to introduce any such parameter in the rst place. Once formulated, the loop
representation will be equivalent to the usual connection representation with
 = 0.
One can introduce an arbitrary parameter  into a loop representation of
a more complex theory, as Fort and Gambini show. But from the holonomy
perspective there would have been no empirical reason to formulate such a more
complex theory, and the fact that even more precise experiments do not require
it would be a considered a conclusive reason to prefer the simpler theory the
one that never introduced an empirically superuous  parameter.
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